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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE REGULATION
OF CORPORATE LAWYERS
James M McCauley*
On July 30, 2002, in an effort to demonstrate to the American public2
a resolve to crack down on corporate scandals such as Enron,' Adelphia,
WorldCom, 3 and Global Crossing, President Bush signed into law the
"Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 4 Proclaiming that the new law will restore
investor confidence, reform the oversight of public accounting and increase
the transparency of corporate financial statements, the new act proposes to:
1. Create an independent public company accounting oversight
board5 to oversee the companies that are subject to the federal

Ethics Counsel, Virginia State Bar, Richmond, Virginia.
A description of some of the events leading up to the Enron collapse can be found
at infra pages 21-21.
2 In June 2002, Adelphia Communications filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 11, having disclosed three months earlier that the company had made
unsecured loans to the Rigas family, Adelphia's controlling shareholders, to the tune
of S2.3 billion. Joseph B. Treaster, Adelphia Filesfor Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2002, at C2. Adelphia's common stock, having reached a peak of S28 per share,
is now essentially worthless. Peter Lauria, Adelphia Bottoms Out, THE DAILY DEAL,
June 27, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 22398792.
3 After months of questioning the company's financial statements, executives at
WorldCom finally admitted that the company had overstated its earnings by over
S3.8 billion in the past five quarters. The company caused this gross overstatement
of earnings when it treated costs, such as maintenance, as capital investments instead
of operating costs. WorldCom announced in July 2002 that it would eliminate 20%
of its workforce and its marked capitalization plummeted from S115 billion in 1999
to less than SI million in 2002. See Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom
Says it Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002,
atAl.
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
5 The board shall have five members but shall not include more than two persons
who are or have been certified public accountants. No member shall be employed by
any firm providing professional services to a publicly held company or engaged in
any other business activity. The members of the board shall be appointed by the
SEC, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury. The board shall not be a federal
agency nor any of its members regarded as federal employees or agents. The
members selected shall be "appointed from among prominent individuals of integrity
and reputation who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors
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securities laws and require mandatory registration for all public
accounting firms that audit publicly held companies. The board is
empowered to inspect, regulate, discipline and sanction auditing
firms, and promulgate ethical standards and other rules with respect
to the issuance of audit reports. In addition, the board shall report
any illegal acts, practices or omissions to the appropriate federal and
state regulatory and law enforcement agencies. The SEC will have
oversight authority over the board.6
2. Amend Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 to
make it unlawful for a public accounting firm, or any person
associated with that firm, to concurrently provide non-audit services
to clients they audit, including:
A. "bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting
records or financial statements of the audit client;"
and
design
systems
information
"financial
B.
implementation;"
C. "appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or
contribution-in-kind reports;"
D. "actuarial services;"
E. "internal audit outsourcing services;"
F. "management functions or human resources;"
G. "broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment
banking services;"
H. "legal services and expert services unrelated to the
audit; and"
I.
"any other service that the Board determines, by
regulation, is impermissible." 8
A public accounting firm may provide to an audit client other
permitted non-audit services (i.e., tax services) but only if such activity is
pre-approved by the Board, meets the Board's requirements and disclosure to
investors is made. 9
and the public, and an understanding of the responsibilities for and nature of the
financial disclosures required of... accountants with respect to the preparation and
issuance of audit reports with respect to such disclosures." Id. at § 101(e)(1).
61d. at § 101.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
8 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745., at § 201(a)
(emphasis added).
9
1d. at § 201 (emphasis added).
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3. Conduct a study to consider mandatory rotation of registered
public accounting firms.' 0
4. Prohibit the listing of the securities of any corporation that is not
in compliance with the Act's requirements."
5. Impose corporate responsibility for financial statements or
reports, by requiring the principal officers to certify in each annual or
quarterly report that:
A. "the signing officer has reviewed the report;"
B. "based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made... not misleading;"
C. "based on such officer's knowledge, the financial
statements, and other information included in the report,
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition
and results of operations" of the company;
D. "the signing officers":
1. "are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls;"
2. "have designed internal controls to ensure that
material information relating to the [company] and
its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such
officers";
3. "have evaluated the effectiveness of the
[company's] internal controls as of a date within 90
days prior to the report; and"
4. "have presented in the report their conclusions
about the effectiveness of their internal controls
based on their evaluation as of that date;"
E. "the signing officers have disclosed to the [company's]
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors(or
person's fulfilling the equivalent function)1. "all significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls which could adversely
affect the [company's] ability to record, process,

'0 Id. at § 207.
" Id. at § 301.
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summarize and report financial data and have
identified for the [company's] auditors any material
weaknesses in internal controls; and"
2. "any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a
significant12 role in the company's internal
controls."'

6. Impose forfeiture of any bonus or equity based compensation
earned by the chief executive and chief financial officers for the
twelve-month period following public issuance of any financial
report, as a result of any misconduct defined by the Act, or
noncompliance with the Act's requirements relating to financial
reporting. Such profits or compensation
will be reimbursed to the
3
company, not the federal government.'
7.

14
Prohibit insider trading during pension fund blackout periods.

8. Develop Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys
appearingbefore the SEC on behalf of any company whose stock is
publicly traded The SEC will promulgate and implement minimum
standardsfor professionalconduct1for
attorneys acting of behalf of
5
publicly held companies to include:
A. "requiringan attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by the company or employee or any agent
thereof to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive
officer of the company (or the equivalent thereo); and"
B. "if the counsel or officer does not appropriatelyrespond
to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the
violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or
to another committee of the board of directors comprised

12Id.at § 302.

"4 Id.
at § 304(a).
' 1d. at § 306(a).
15Id.at § 307 (emphasis added).
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solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by'the
[companyj, or to the boardof directors.,16
9. Require enhanced financial disclosures, including, with respect to
off-balance sheet transactions, disclosure of contingent obligations,
and the company's relationships "with unconsolidated entities or
other persons, that may have a material current or future effect on the
financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital
expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of revenue
or expenses."' 7
10. Require more stringent regulations for pro forma figures.' 8
9
11. Require a study and report on special purpose entities.'

12. Require enhanced conflict of interest provisions, including
prohibition of personal loans to executives.2 °
13. Require the SEC to implement a code of ethics for senior
financial officers. 2'
14. Enhance SEC review of periodic disclosures by regulated
companies."
15. Increase regulation of securities analysts and research reports
issued by analysts to address conflicts of interest, including rules
requiring disclosure of the
analyst's conflicts of interest in all reports
23
and public appearances.
16. Require that all audit records and workpapers be maintained by
public audit firms for a period of five years from the end of the fiscal
year in which the audit was concluded and making it a criminal act

16Id (emphasis added).
17Id.at

§ 401(a).
"SId.at § 401(b).
'9 1d. at § 401(c).
2 Id at § 402(a).
Id. at § 406.
§ 408.
2Id.at § 501.
21

2 Id at
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to knowingly destroy audit records prior to the expiration of the
required retention period.24
The new legislation has already triggered significant criticism by the
American Bar Association and other nationally known experts such as
Lawrence Fox, a Philadelphia litigator, former Chair of the ABA's Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professionalism, author and frequent lecturer on
the subject of legal ethics.
The ABA's concerns focused on: (1) the Act's "overly broad
definition of 'persons associated' with an accounting firm" which some
could interpret as permitting the newly created board to regulate attorneys
'associated with public accounting firms;' (2) the provisions authorizing the
SEC to promulgate rules of professional conduct for attorneys appearing
before that agency; and (3) a provision in the House legislation that would
permit "the Comptroller General to study the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and existing SEC rules and possibly recommend new
federal legislation or regulations to override the existing rules. 2 5
The third concern of the ABA can be dispensed with quickly. The
conference bill, which President Bush signed into law on July 30, contains
no provision similar to the House bill's provision authorizing the
Comptroller General to study the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
The Act's definition of "persons associated with accounting firms"
could be interpreted as applicable to lawyers. However, the use of that
phrase in the Act always appears in provisions aimed solely at the accounting
profession. Since the Act has a section specifically applicable to lawyers
representing publicly held companies-Section 307-the rules applicable to
accounting firms and "persons associated with accounting firms" should not
be construed as including lawyers.
The Act's requirement that the SEC propose rules of conduct
governing attorneys who appear before the Commission has prompted great
concern by the ABA and others who fear that the federal government is
usurping the authority of the states to regulate the practice of law and
discipline attorneys. Legal ethics expert Larry Fox, expressed his concern:
The very idea of the Senate enacting or directing others to
enact rules of professional responsibility for lawyers should
24 1d. at

§ 802.
25 Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Government Affairs Office, ABA, to the
Hon. Paul S. Sarbanes (July 19, 2002).
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be enough to cause collective professional indigestion. A
fundamental tenet is that our rules shall be promulgated by
the states. Lawyers often have correctly resisted efforts by
the federal government to usurp the state highest courts'
traditional role of regulating lawyers.26
Viewing the Act as an intrusion by the federal government into
lawyer regulation traditionally reserved to the states, and more particularly,
the judiciary, the ABA has commissioned a Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, which recently issued a preliminary report recommending
changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.27 The proposed
changes are intended to encourage lawyers to report evidence of securities
violations and other serious misconduct to the company's managers,
executives or directors. Some of those who participated in writing the report
have said they are troubled by the federal government's encroachment in this
area.
While the Act proposes federal regulation of lawyers, the IRS, INS,
PTO and other federal agencies already regulate lawyers who practice in
areas of particular federal concern. So why shouldn't the same be true of
practice before, or directly related to, the SEC? Granted, some legal practice
is intensely local, such as real estate, trusts and estates, family law, etc.
However, the representation of public companies is a matter of national, if
not global, concern. The federal government has regulated the national
economy for some time now. Isn't it inevitable and appropriate for federal
agencies to have a say in the practice of lawyers?
Sperr " v. The FloridaBar 28 made clear that the federal supremacy
doctrine permits a federal agency to establish rules or practice for persons
authorized to practice before the PTO. The states could not interfere with the
federal regulation of practitioners before that agency by prosecuting a
registered patent examiner for UPL. Indeed, the states have accepted the
concept that a federal agency may discipline a lawyer to the extent that state
bars have imposed reciprocal discipline based on disciplinary actions taken
by a federal agency such as the PTO.29
26 Lawrence J. Fox, Corporate Balancing Act: Courts, Not Capitol Hill, Should
Regulate
Lawyers, FORUM, July 30, 2002.
27
The PreliminaryRep. Of the ABA Task Force on Corp.Resp. (July 16, 2002),

available at

http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/preliminaryreport.pdf.
28 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
See, e. g., In the Matter of Martin G. Mullen, VSB Docket No. 02-000-1877
(2002) (On May 7, 2002, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board suspended
29
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Moreover, the authority given the SEC to regulate attorneys
representing SEC-regulated public companies does not supplant or pre-empt
the states' power to discipline the attorney for the same conduct. All the SEC
can do under the Act is censure, suspend, or disbar the attorney from
practicing before that agency. Only a state bar can take action against the
attorney's license to practice law.
Finally, is it not somewhat ironic that the ABA objects to the federal
government attempting to develop national standards of practice for
securities lawyers, when the ABA promulgates and encourages the states to
adopt uniform rules of professional conduct? While some lawyers may be
uncomfortable or feel threatened by federal or national standards of conduct,
a lawyer's professional obligations in terms of reporting serious misconduct
higher up the corporate ladder should not differ from state to state or depend
on where the corporate lawyer is licensed.
The media's hyperventilation over these recent corporate scandals
creates the impression that they are unprecedented. Regrettably, this is
simply not so. Over the past fifty years, this country has witnessed a series
of newsworthy corporate frauds. All of these scandals raise questions about
a lawyer's responsibilities upon discovering, or having reason to know, that
officers or other agents of the lawyer's corporate client are engaged in
conduct that violates the law, or breaches their fiduciary duty to the
corporation, likely resulting in harm to the corporation, shareholders, or other
third persons.
Examples include the National Student Marketing
Corporation. 30 NSMC was a conglomerate purportedly selling to college
Martin G. Mullen's license to practice law in Virginia for four years. The Board took
this reciprocal action based on a four year suspension by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) of Mr. Mullen's license to practice law before that federal
agency. The PTO suspension was agreed to by Mr. Mullen and was based upon his
neglect in handling 14 patent applications.).
30 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978). This
was a civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
against the law firms of White & Case, and Lord, Bissell & Brooke (LBB) for their
role in the 1969 merger of two companies, National Student Marketing Corporation
(NSMC) and Interstate National Corporation (Interstate). The SEC alleged that the
two law firms aided and abetted corporate officers in securities fraud by failing to
disclose material information revealed in a comfort letter written by accounting firm
Peat, Marwick, which would have disclosed to investors substantial problems
concerning NSMC's financial health. After the merger, in 1970, when the press
discovered NSMC's true financial condition, the value of the stock decreased
dramatically. The court concluded that the merger had been approved by the
Interstate shareholders based on information that was misleading, and that the
attorneys involved owed a duty to take steps designed to insure that this material
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students everything from coffee mugs to computer dates.
Its stock
skyrocketed from SI to a high of $69, and was seen by investors as one of
several glamour stocks of the period. Some of NSMC's officers and one
accountant from Peat, Marwick suffered criminal convictions and went to
prison for their participation in this securities fraud. The protracted civil
case, dragging on for over 10 years, settled with some $30 million paid to
NSMC investors. White & Case contributed S1.95 million and LBB S1.3
paid million to the fund.3' Scandal in the late 1960s, O.P.M. in the early
1970s 32, Lincoln Savings & Loan during the S & L crisis of the 1980s 33, and
information would be disclosed to the shareholders. Instead they took no measure to
delay the closing of the merger pending disclosure and their silence added to the
appearance of the closing's legitimacy. The court therefore found that the attorney
defendants in this suit aided and abetted the violations of Section 10 (b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated by the Commission pursuant to
the Act.
3' Hazard, Koniak & Crampton, THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF LAWYERNG 118 (3d ed.
1999).
32 The O.P.M. cases, which arose in the early 1980s, arose out of a company created
in 1970 which purchased mainframe computers from manufacturers like IBM, and in
turn leased them to businesses such as A T & T and Rockwell. Financial institutions
would loan O.P.M. the money to purchase the computers, hold a security interest in
the computer, and collect from the lessee periodic payments to repay the loan.
During the 1970s, O.P.M. became one of the largest computer leasing companies. It
got that way by slashing its prices, but in doing so, O.P.M. found itself incapable of
meeting its operating costs while its owners continued to maintain their extravagant
life styles. O.P.M. was practically insolvent from its beginning, but the company
kept increasing its market share, by creating fraudulent loan transactions, using a
single computer a security for several loans, and overstating the value of the
equipment to get larger loans. The arrangement became a classic "Ponzi Scheme"
with O.P.M. fraudulently obtaining new loan proceeds to cover payments due on
other computers. Inevitably, though, the new loans had to be repaid, requiring
O.P.M. to resort to more fraudulent transactions to obtain more proceeds to make
payment on its last round of fraudulently obtained loans. Throughout the decade, the
law firm of Singer Hutner handled O.P.M.'s legal work, closing these loan
transactions and providing opinions for lenders to rely on concerning the financial
condition of their client and the soundness of the security for these loans.
Ultimately, a corporate officer at O.P.M. resigned and notified the law firm by letter
that numerous transactions with Rockwell, a large defense contractor, were
fraudulent. Having discovered that the law firm had closed transactions for O.P.M.
that were fraudulent, the lawyers consulted with two experts in legal ethics to
ascertain what they should do. The ethics consultants told Singer Hutner what the
lawyers wanted to hear: namely, that the transactions amounted to past fraud, which
the New York Code of Professional Responsibility did not require the lawyers to
reveal or rectify, and that the firm could continue to close new loans for O.P.M. if

24
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the firm had certification that the new transactions were legitimate. Moreover, the
ethics experts advised that as long as the Singer Hutner lawyers had no direct
knowledge that the officers at O.P.M. intended to continue the fraudulent loan
transactions, the law firm was not required to withdraw from the representation.
Taking comfort in the ethics advice given, Singer Hutner continued to close loans for
O.P.M. for the next eight months. O.P.M. continued its fraudulent transactions,
providing the law firm with false certifications that these subsequent transactions
were legitimate, while cheating lenders out of another $85 million before the
principal owners of O.P.M. were arrested. The law, accounting and investment
banking firms that assisted O.P.M. in these transactions settled liability claims
totaling $65 million, with Singer Hutner contributing $10 million. The law firm
dissolved and the reputations of the lawyers involved were damaged. See Hazard,
Koniak & Crampton, supra note 31, 304-08.
33 See FDIC. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 669 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), reaffirmed on remand, 61 F.3d 17
(9th Cir. 1995). In the 1980s hundreds of thrifts failed and the federal government's
obligation to stand behind federally insured deposits cost taxpayers hundreds of
billions of dollars. Federal agencies brought both criminal and civil actions against
many of the managers of these failed thrifts as well as their accountants and lawyers.
One of the most frequently publicized cases arose out of the business activities of
Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings & Loan involving fraudulent land/tax
transactions and overvaluation of real estate created to show "profits" on the books
and placate federal regulators and examiners questioning the S & L's "risky" loans.
The law firm of Jones Day was hired to represent Lincoln. During a regulatory
compliance audit, which Jones Day insisted was merely a pre-FHLBB examination
compliance review, Jones Day found multiple regulatory violations and knew that
Lincoln had backdated files, destroyed appraisals, removed appraisals from files,
told appraisals not to issue reports when their oral valuations were too low and
violated regulations concerning direct and affiliated investments. The court stated,
among other things:
[Where] a law firm believes the management of a corporate client is
committing serious regulatory violations, the firm has an obligation
to actively discuss the violative conduct, urge cessation of the
activity, and withdraw from representation where the firm's legal
services may contribute to the continuation of such conduct.
In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings and Loan Securities Litigation
(Jones Day), 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992). Jones Day lost its motion for
summary judgment and ended up settling with the bondholders and stockholders in
this class action suit for $24 million. See Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1992, p. A3. Similarly,
Kaye Scholer's aggressive representation of Lincoln during a bank examination as
outside counsel caused the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in March 1992 to file
administrative charges against the firm and three of its partners. The central charge
was that Kaye Scholer knew, but failed to disclose to bank examiners, material facts
thereby making representations made by Kaye Scholer to the bank board false,
fraudulent and misleading. OTS sought restitution in the amount of $275 million
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the more recent BCCI bank failure and fraud of the 1990s, which involved
Washington insiders Clark M. Clifford and Robert Altman.34 In each of
these situations, without admitting liability, outside law firms paid massive
sums of money to settle liability claims in which injured parties asserted that
lawyers assisted their corporate clients in conduct that was fraudulent or
illegal. Moreover, in addition to criminal prosecution as an accessory to the
client's criminal conduct, a lawyer may be disciplined if he or she counsels
or assists the client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. See Virginia Rule 1.2 (c).
Critics of the new federal law assert that it changes the rules
governing a lawyer's duties when learning that an employee or officer is
engaging in misconduct that could seriously injure the company. In fact, the
requirements imposed by Section 307 of the Act are not inconsistent with the
lawyer's obligations under Virginia's Rule 1.13 or ABA Model Rule 1.13.3
and froze the law firm's assets. Kaye Scholer settled the matter for $41 million
without contesting the injunction order or admitting or denying the allegations.
Hazard, Koniak & Crampton, supra note 31, at 756-57. Finally in FederalDeposit
Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992) the court held that a
receiver of a failed thrift stated a cause of action against a law firm that assisted the
thrift in the issuance of two real estate syndications offered to investors. The thrift
was in unsound financial condition, its officers fraudulently overvalued assets,
embezzled and generally "cooked the books." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 969 F. 2d
at 746. The court made a very scary statement:
[A]ttomeys, in rendering opinions relating to the securities laws, are not
justified in assuming facts as represented to them by their clients [are
correct]. Rather. . . the attorney must make a reasonable effort to
independently verify the facts on which the opinion is based.
34 Former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford and his law partner Robert Altman
settled claims for $5 million and were force to resign their positions as top official of
First American Bank. They were the key figures in BCCI's acquisition and
management of United States banks. BCCI, or Bank of Credit and Commerce
International, was shut down by regulators in 1991 amid allegations of arms
smuggling, drug running and financing of terrorists. Clifford and Altman were
accused of participating in a plot to help BCCI secretly gain control of U.S. banks.
"Fed Settles BCCI Case," The New Republic, February 3, 1998.
35
Rule 1.1 3 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses
to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration
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If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a
refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign or may decline
to represent the client in that matter in accordance with Rule 1.16. Neither
the Act nor Rule 1.13 require or even authorize the lawyer to publicly reveal
or report evidence of past corporate wrongdoing. The lawyer's ethical duty
of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 (Virginia or ABA version) prohibits the
disclosure of client information related to a client's past crimes. Unlike the
ABA version of Rule 1.6, which has no mandatory disclosure exceptions to
client confidentiality, Virginia's Rule 1.6 requires a lawyer to report a
client's intent to commit a future crime.36 One could argue perhaps that the
ABA Model Rules need revision in this area to enable or require lawyers to
disclose information necessary to prevent a continuing fraud by a client. At
least thirty-seven
states have rules that permit lawyers to disclose such
37
information.
to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the
lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent
motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such
matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed
to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information
relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may
include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization;
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority
that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
36

Virginia Rule 1.6 (c)(1).

37 Hazard, Koniak & Crampton, supra note 31, at 308. The vast majority of U.S.

jurisdictions have not adopted Model Rule 1.6 as recommended by the ABA.
Thirty-seven states permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a
client's criminal fraud; four states require a lawyer to make such a disclosure; and
only nine states and the District of Columbia may be viewed as forbidding a lawyer
to reveal such information. See ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
ETHICS RULES ON CLIENT CONFIDENCES (2001), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

134-144 (2002) (tabulating the current law of all U.S. jurisdictions

on disclosure of confidential information to prevent harm to third persons).
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The primary rules that govern the lawyer's ethical obligations when
faced with corporate client fraud are Rules 1.6 and 1.13. Although
Virginia's Rule 1.13 and ABA Model Rule 1.13 are identical, the obligations
of an attorney under Virginia's Rule 1.6, in contrast to ABA Model Rule 1.6
are very different.
Issues Facing the Corporate Lawyer When Officers Engage in Illegal or
Fraudulent Conduct
The issues that arise in these situations are complex ones that turn on
factual and legal issues including the following:
1. When and what did the lawyer know at the time of the alleged
illegal or fraudulent activity?
2. What scienter (intent) standard should be applied to the lawyer's
conduct? Stated differently, when does a lawyer "know" that
employees or agents of an organization are engaging in illegal or
fraudulent activity that could result in substantial harm to the
organization?
3. DOES A LAWYER WHO LEARNS OF FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES
SUGGESTING POSSIBLE FRAUD HAVE A DUTY TO INQUIRE FURTHER?

4. When the lawyer knows, or has reason to know, that officers of
his corporate client are pursuing a fraudulent course of conduct,
should or must the lawyer take this information to the client's
highest authority, the board of directors?
5. IF THE OFFICERS AND/OR THE BOARD REFUSE TO CEASE OR
RECTIFY WHAT THE LAWYER BELIEVES IS FRAUDULENT CONDUCT,

MAY OR MUST THE LAWYER DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION TO
DEFRAUDED THIRD PERSONS OR A PUBLIC OFFICER?

Disclosure ofInformation Adverse to the CorporateClient to Third Parties
When may a lawyer inform others outside the company when he or
she learns that the corporate client is engaged in fraudulent or illegal
activity? The answer to this question is difficult and depends on which
state's ethics rules apply. The circumstances, if any, under which an attorney
may disclose client fraud or criminal wrongdoing to prevent harm to others
has always been the subject of controversy.
ABA Model Rule 1.6 provides exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality only:
(1) where the lawyer "reasonably believes disclosure of client
information is necessary. . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal
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act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or bodily
harm;"
(2) when disclosure is required by law or court order;
(3) when necessary to seek advice about compliance with the ethics
rules; or
(4) for purposes of the lawyer's self defense or to establish his or
her fees.
Other than perhaps the "self defense" exception, ABA Model Rule
1.6 is likely to have little application in the context of fraud or criminal
conduct within an organization represented by the attorney. The exceptions
do not cover fraud or criminal conduct typical of corporations. Assuming
that perhaps some corporate behavior may be deemed likely to result in death
or substantial bodily harm (i.e., toxic tort or product liability case) the
exception's requirement that harm or death be "imminent" rules out this
exception, and most corporate wrongdoing is likely to result in fmancial loss
or injury to property.
Virginia's version of Rule 1.6 permits, but does not require,
disclosure where a lawyer possesses information which "clearly establishes"
that the client has, during the course of the representation perpetrated a fraud
on a third party related to the subject of the representation.38
A lawyer
confronted with a client fraud situation must consider:
1. When did the fraudulent activity occur, i.e., did it occur during
the lawyer's engagement (or prior or subsequent thereto)? Is the
fraudulent activity ongoing?
2. Is the fraudulent activity related to the subject matter of the
representation? Stated differently, is there a nexus between the
services provided by the lawyer and the fraudulent activity?
3. What is the source of the lawyer's information or knowledge of
the client's fraudulent activity? Is the information reliable? Does
the information or evidence "clearly
establish" that the client has
39
perpetrated a fraud on third party?

38 VA. CODE ANN.

Pt. 6, § II, Rule 1.6 (b)(3).

39 Id.; see X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd sub nom.

Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that DR4-101(C)(3)
'clearly establishes' standard imposes a heavier burden on the party seeking
disclosure than the prima facie standard of the crime-fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege).
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In regard to the first issue, "timing is everything." If the client's
fraudulent activity occurred before the lawyer's engagement, it did not occur
"in the course of the representation" as required by Rule 1.6 (b)(3) and
therefore the information cannot be disclosed pursuant to that rule. Past
criminal and fraudulent acts by a client are presumptively protected under
Rule 1.6 and cannot be revealed unless the client consents.4 ° Under those
circumstances, it would be necessary for the lawyer to obtain the client's
consent after consultation, including the lawyer's assessment of the legal
consequences of making the disclosure.
Similarly, if the client's fraudulent conduct occurs after the lawyer's
engagement has ended, it did not occur "in the course of the representation"
and cannot be revealed without the client's informed consent.4'
In summary, Rule 1.6 (b)(3) permits disclosure of client fraud only
if: (1) the lawyer has evidence which clearly establishes that the client has
perpetrated a fraud on a third party; and (2) the fraud occurred in the course
of representing the client 42; and (3) the fraud is related to the subject matter
of the representation.
Failure to analyze theses issues carefully before making disclosure
may create malpractice and disciplinary exposure for the attorney. The duty
to protect client confidences and secrets is far more protective than the
attorney-client privilege. Except as permitted under Rule 1.6 (b)(3),
disclosure of any information that the client has engaged in fraud on a third
party would be detrimental and embarrassing to the client and therefore a
violation of Rule 1.6.
A more difficult problem is when the client continues to engage in
an "ongoing crime or fraud." The parameters of a "continuing" or "ongoing"
crime or fraud are not very clear. An example of a "continuing" wrong
would be the client's unlawful possession of stolen goods. Confidential
communications between attorney and client concerning the indictment for
theft and possession and the facts underlying those offenses are privileged.

40 Wigmore draws a distinction as to whether the fraud was committed before or

after the attorney was hired. A client who in the past has committed a wrongdoing is
entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege. The culpable, as well as the
innocent client is entitled to confidential communications with an attorney. First
Union Nat'l Bank v. Whitener, 715 So.2d 979, 983 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1998).
41 See LEO # 1643 (1995) (divorce lawyer's disclosure of former client's
concealment of assets from bankruptcy court not authorized because client's fraud
did not occur in the course of the representation).
42 See also In Re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Clearly the
crime-fraud exception will defeat the attorney-client privilege only as to misconduct
that occurred during the period of representation.. ").
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However, client-attorney communications about how the client may continue
to remain in possession of the stolen property or information concerning the
property's current location are not protected.43 In LEO 929 (1987) the
Virginia legal ethics committee concluded that a lawyer receiving an
unsolicited letter from a fugitive client (capias outstanding for failure to
appear in court) indicating that the fugitive intends to leave the United States
may not reveal the client's intent because it amounts to a "continuing wrong"
rather than a future crime (which would have to be revealed). This opinion is
confusing because the committee characterizes the client's intent to flee the
country as a "continuing wrong" which does not fit in the category of a
prospective crime and therefore the client's whereabouts cannot be revealed.
In later opinions, however, the committee refers to an "ongoing" crime or
fraud as not protected under the confidentiality rule. 44 Unless some valid
distinction can be drawn between a "continuing" and an "ongoing" wrong, it
is difficult to reconcile these conflicting positions. Some legal authorities
state that the so-called "crime-fraud" exception (permitting or requiring
disclosure of client information) to the attorney-client privilege does apply to
client crimes or frauds that are "ongoing" or "continuing.' ' 45 In addition, if
the lawyer's services are used to perpetuate a past wrong or fraud, some
courts hold that the "crime-fraud" exception will apply and the
communications between attorney and client relating to the lawyer's services
are not privileged.46

43

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

44 See LEO 1688 (1996).
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 82 cmt.e at 617 (2000).

§ 82 cmt.e at 617 (2000);
Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1336-37 (Pa. 1986) (in dicta, the court
states that a lawyer giving advice to a client who was a fugitive from justice would
become an accessory to continuing criminal conduct which exempts the
communications from attorney-client privilege under the "crime-fraud" doctrine).
46 In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 631 F.Supp. 32 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (client
admitted sales of cocaine but reported no from the sales on tax return prepared by
lawyer; failure to report income was fraudulent if not criminal act); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 966 (1998) (the
exception does not apply if the assistance is sought only to disclose past wrongdoing,
but it does apply if the assistance was used to cover up and perpetuate the crime or
fraud).
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Is There a Duty to Investigate or Can the Lawyer Do Nothing and Remain
Silent?
What should a lawyer do when he or she learns information
suggesting employees or officers are engaged in wrongdoing that could
result in substantial harm to a corporate client? Some argue that the lawyer
has a duty to investigate and make an inquiry and there is some legal
authority to support that position. In FDIC. v. O'Melveny & Myers, the
receiver of a failed thrift stated a claim against a law firm that had assisted
the thrift in two real estate syndications offered to investors. When the
private placement was made, the thrift was in unsound financial condition;
its officers had fraudulently overvalued assets, embezzled funds and
generally "cooked the books. 4 7 The complaint alleged that the law firm,
knowing of the recent resignations of the thrift's prior auditors and outside
law firm, failed to question the auditors, the law firm, federal or state
regulators, or the thrift's financial officer about the thrift's financial status
before rendering legal opinions and doing other work that assisted the thrift
in soliciting investors."
After the thrift failed, the FDIC, acting as
conservator, rescinded the investments and was assigned the investors'
claims against O'Melveny.49
The receiver then brought suit against
O'Melveny for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
breach of fiduciary duty.
In FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir.1992), the receiver of a
failed bank sued the bank's outside counsel for failing to investigate claims
made in a civil lawsuit against the bank that alleged that the bank's president
had conspired to defraud the bank of several million dollars through a
fraudulent loan scheme. 5' The lawyers accepted the president's explanation
of the situation and failed to inquire further or to inform the board of
directors of the allegations. 52 The court upheld a jury verdict against the
lawyers, stating that "there was ample proof for the jury to find that
defendants were negligent in their professional duties to the bank, and that
their negligence was a cause of loss" to the bank.53
47 FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and

remandedon other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), reaffirmed on remand, 61 F.3d 17
(9th Cir. 1995).
48 Id. at 747.
49id

5 id

5'
FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1992).
52
53

id.

1d. at 1551.
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On the other hand, some cases have held that the lawyers owe no
duty to third persons defrauded by a corporate client, even though the lawyer
could have taken some measures to protect the third party's interests. The
court in Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 926 (1992), held that a lawyer has no duty to correct client
misrepresentations to third persons before closing a transaction with the
defrauded person.5 4 The lawyer, aware that the client's financial situation
had deteriorated, forwarded the client's false financial statement to the
person buying the client's business and taking in return an unsecured note for
a portion of the purchase price.
When the client filed for bankruptcy, the
purchaser suffered financial loss. 56 The court affirmed dismissal of counts
charging the firm with liability as an aider and abettor under federal
securities law and Maryland tort law.5 7 The Seventh Circuit Court stated that
"lawyers have no duty to disclose information about clients to third party
purchasers or investors in the absence of a confidential relationship between
the attorney and the third party." When the lawyer merely documents the
transaction and does not make representations to the third party or provide a
legal opinion that does so, the lawyer is not liable even though ordinary
agency law (applicable to agents of sellers generally) would impose
liability.58The United States Supreme Court brought some relief to securities
lawyers in its decision in CentralBank of Denver v. FirstInterstate Bank of
Denver,59 rejecting a federal claim of civil liability for lawyers and other
advisors, i.e., accountants. However, lawyers and other advisors may still be
held liable under state securities and tort law.
Also critical is the extent of the lawyer's knowledge and
involvement in the transaction. In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,Starnes &
Holt6° the court rejected a claim on summary judgment that a lawyer assisted
the corporate client in a fraudulent transaction, because the lawyer's
participation in the transaction was too insubstantial. The lawyer, a general
practitioner, assisted the corporate client in corporate and property matters
which were part of the project in which interests were sold to the plaintiffinvestors. Although the lawyer received the client's selling materials, he did
not review or approve them nor was his name on them. The corporate client
54 Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 926

(1992).
55
56 Id. at 488.
Id.
57
id. at 495-96.
58
1d. at 494-95.
59 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
60 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
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engaged a large firm to handle the securities issues. That firm settled claims
made against it for assisting client fraud to the tune of $612, 500. In regard
to the general practitioner, the court observed:
...A plaintiff's case against an aider, abettor or conspirator
may not rest on a bare inference that the defendant "must
have had" knowledge of the facts. The plaintiff must
support the inference with some reason to conclude that the
defendant has thrown in his lot with the primary violators.
Law firms and accountants may act or remain silent for good
reasons as well as bad ones, and allowing scienter or
conspiracy to defraud to be inferred from the silence of a
professional firm may expand the scope of liability far
beyond that authorized in [controlling Supreme Court
decisions]. 61If the plaintiff does not have direct evidence of
scienter, the court should ask whether the fraud (or coverup) was in the interest of the defendants. Did they gain by
bilking the buyers of the securities? Cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. at
662-64. In this case the firms did not gain [an accounting
firm was also involved]. They received none of the proceeds
from the sales. They did not receive any fees for rendering
advice in connection with the sales to the plaintiffs. Both
firms billed so little time ... that it is inconceivable that they
joined a venture to feather their nests by defrauding
investors. They had nothing to gain and everything to lose.
There is no sound basis, therefore, on which a jury could
infer that the firms joined common cause with other
offenders or aided and abetted a scheme with the necessary
state of mind62
Going Up the CorporateLadder
When does a corporate lawyer need to "climb the corporate ladder"
and report misconduct to the Board of Directors? Virginia Rule 1.13 (b)
states
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization is
61Citations omitted.
62

Barker, 797 F.2d at 497.
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engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed,
the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of
the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of
the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the
organization and the apparent motivation of the person
involved, the policies of the organization concerning such
matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures
taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the
organization and the risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside the organization. Such
measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the
organization;
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of
the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.63
Critics of the rule assert that it is too imprecise and really requires
nothing. Some lawyers may conclude that remaining silent and doing
nothing is in the best interest of the organization. Considering some of the
64
civil liability cases cited, such an interpretation may be a recipe for disaster.
FDIC v. Clark is a good example of a case based on failure to climb the
corporate ladder.65 Once a corporate lawyer has reason to believe that
63

11 VA. CODE ANN. R. 1.13 (Repl. Vol. 2002).

64 See, e.g., In re American Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.

Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("[w]here a law firm believes the management of a
corporate client is committing serious regulatory violation, the firm has an obligation
... to urge cessation of the activity;" failure to go to the board of directors could not
be excused because thought to be "futile"); FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir.
1992) (jury verdict affirmed when lawyer failed to take allegations of officer
misconduct to the board of directors).
65 See generally Clark,978 F.2d 1541.
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officers or employees are engaging in wrongdoing that could cause
substantial harm to the organization, isn't it always in the best interest of the
organization for a lawyer to "climb the corporate ladder" as high as
necessary to address the problem? Since Rule 1.13 (b) gives the lawyer the
discretion to "climb the corporate ladder" why wouldn't a lawyer choose this
approach? 6 A practical answer may be that the lawyer, particularly in-house
counsel, does not wish to be seen as a "whistleblower" by the person(s) who
hire and fire them. The problem may be extremely difficult where the
conduct of these people needs to be reported.
General Overview of the Enron Scandal
On October 16, 2001, Enron announced that it was taking a S544
million after-tax charge against earnings related to its transactions with
LJM2 Co-Investment, L.P. (LJM2), a partnership created and managed by
former CFO Andrew Fastow. 67 Enron also announced a reduction of
shareholders' equity of S1.2 billion related to transactions with LJM2. Less
than one month later, Enron announced that it was restating its financial
statements for the years 1997 though 2001 because of accounting errors
associated with another Fastow partnership-LJM Cayman, L.P. (LJM1) and
an additional related party, Chewco Investments, L.P. (Chewco)." Chewco
was managed by another Enron employee, Kopper, who reported to Fastow.
The financial restatements for these related party entities was very large,
reducing Enron's reported net income by S28 million in 1997 (of S105
million total), by S133 million is 1998 (of S703 million total), by S248
million in 1999 (of S898 million total), and by 599 million in 2000 (of S979
million total). The restatement reduced shareholders' equity by S258 million
in 1997, by S391 million in 1998, by S710 million in1999 and by S754
million in 2000. Reported debt was increased by S711 million in 1997, by
S561 million in 1998, by S685 million in 1999, and by S628 million in
2000.69 Enron also revealed, for the first time, that Fastow received more
than S30 million from LJM1 and LJM2. These announcements killed market

66See
67

11 VA. CODE ANN R.1.13 (Repl. Vol. 2002).

Special Investigative Comm of the Bd. of Directors of Enron Corp., at 2, (Feb. 1,

2001),
available at http://news.findlawcom/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport.html
[hereinafter Powers Report].
6Id.

at 2.

69Id.at 3.
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confidence and investor trust in Enron. Less than one month later, Enron
filed for bankruptcy. 0
According to the media, from 1993 to 1999, executives and directors
of Enron formed a number of different "off-the-book" partnerships, which, if
properly formed, permitted Enron to lawfully record debt and losses in a
manner other than on Enron's balance sheet. These "special purpose
entities," some of which were named after "Star Wars" characters and
vacation properties, became the subject of an SEC investigation last year. w
Using these complex financial structures, Enron stands accused of
concealing millions of dollars of debt so that shareholders were unaware of
Enron's actual financial picture. Enron, like all other publicly held
companies, was required under federal securities law to make public
disclosures concerning these related party transactions (LJM, ChewCo, JEDI,
etc.). Enron purportedly failed to disclose material facts necessary for
shareholders and the investing public to understand these transactions and
Enron's actual financial condition.
The Powers Report 72 identifies significant problems in addition to
those publicly disclosed by Enron or the media. Enron employees involved
in the partnerships enriched themselves by tens of millions of dollars they
never should have received. More critically, the partnerships were used by
Enron management to enter into business transactions that it could not do
with proper unrelated commercial third parties. Many of the transactions
were solely for the purpose of creating favorable financial statements, and
not in furtherance of a bona fide business objective.73
What Role Did the Lawyers Play in this Mess?
Enron apparently looked to the law firm of Vinson & Elkins (V & E)
for legal advice in connection with a number of questionable transactions and
V & E appears to have been Enron's primary outside counsel. Indeed, prior
to terminating the relationship, Enron, was V & E's largest client,
accounting for more than seven percent (7%) of V & E's revenue in 2001.

701d.
71 Id. at
72 Id. at

5.
3-4.
73Id. at4.
74 Mike France et al., One Big Client, One Big Hassle, Bus. WK, Jan. 28, 2002, at
38.
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The Enron account generated over S150 million for V & E over the years
1996-2001. 7s
Beginning in April of this year, V & E was named as a defendant in
two Enron-related class actions filed in federal court in Houston, Texas: (1) a
securities class action suit filed by investors alleging that the law firm
participated in a scheme to defraud investors with misleading disclosures that
inflated Enron's profits and financial condition; 76 and (2) a class action suit
filed by participants in Enron's 401 (k) plan charging V & 77E with violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The Enron scandal raises many questions about V & E's professional
responsibility as Enron's chief outside counsel. How did V & E let Enron
make these tragic mistakes? Did the law firm aid and abet Enron and
Anderson in committing fraud? Did V & E lose its independence when it
advised Enron of the legality of the "special purpose vehicles" and
partnerships used by the company to deflect ever increasing losses and debt
from the company's financial statements? Did V & E have an ethical duty to
require more information from Enron and Anderson or audit its client more
diligently? Did V & E participate in the cover-up and obstruction of the
SEC's investigation of Enron's accounting procedures? What are the ethical
duties of corporate counsel when they learn that officers or employees are
engaging in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the
corporation? Can a lawyer ethically remain "passive" when a corporate
client engages or intends to engage in activity that will cause substantial
economic harm to third parties which the lawyer does not represent?
Although many questions still remain, a preliminary report issued
February 1, 2002 written by William Powers, Jr., a Texas law school dean
and member of the Enron Board of Directors ("Powers Report") 78reveals
some information about V & E's involvement. Essentially, the Powers
Report holds V & E, as well as Enron management and Arthur Anderson,
responsible for the inadequate disclosures which misled investors into

75 James V. Grimaldi & Peter Behr, Houston Law Firm Helped Craft Enron Deals,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A6.
Newby v. Enron Corp., No. CIV.A. G-02-0084 (D.S. Tex. May 16, 2002),
availableat 2002 WL 1001058.
' Despite Efforts to Break Free, Enron Web Traps Vinson & Elkins, TEXAS
LAWYER, April 18, 2002. The employee suit is styled Pamela M Tittle, et al. v.
Enron Corp., et al.
76

The Powers Report can be viewed on line at
See supra note 28.
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport
7
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believing that Enron's dealings with these "special purpose entities" were
"arm's length transactions., 7 9 According to the Powers Report:
Enron's related-party disclosures in its proxy statements, as
well as in the financial statement footnotes in its periodic
reports, resulted from collaborative efforts among Enron's
Senior Management, employees in the legal, accounting,
investor relations, and business units, and outside advisors at
Andersen and Vinson & Elkins. Nevertheless, it appears that
no one outside of Enron Global Finance, the entity
principally responsible for the related-party transactions,
exercised significant supervision or control over the
disclosure process concerning these transactions.8 °
Various disclosures were approved by one or more of Enron's
outside auditors and its inside and outside counsel.8' According to the
Powers Report, the related party transactions were so complex that the
accountants and lawyers relied heavily on, and generally deferred to, the
officers in Enron that were familiar with these transactions.82 However, V &
E was supposed to make sure that the disclosures were correct and complied
with federal securities law and SEC rules. At pages 25-26 of the Powers
Report, in the Executive Summary, it states:
Vinson & Elkins, as Enron's longstanding outside counsel,
provided advice and prepared documentation in connection
with many of the transactions discussed in the Report. It
also assisted Enron with the preparation of its disclosures of
related party transactions in the proxy statements and the
footnotes to the financial statements in Enron's periodic
SEC filings. Management and the Board relied heavily on
the perceived approval by Vinson & Elkins of the structure
and disclosure of the transactions. Enron's Audit and
Compliance Committee, as well as in-house counsel, looked
to it for assurance that Enron's public disclosures were
legally sufficient. It would be inappropriate to fault Vinson
& Elkins for accounting matters, which are not in its
expertise. However, Vinson & Elkins should have brought a

79 Powers Report, supra note 67, at 178.
80

Id. at 181 (emphasis added).

" Id.at 17.
82 Id.
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stronger, more objective
and more critical voice to the
3
disclosure process.8
At pages 176-77, the Report discusses the Watkins letter,84 which
triggered a limited internal investigation by V & E: "The result of the V & E
review was largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the
investigation and the process employed.... The scope and process of the
investigation appear to have been structured with less skepticism that was
needed to see through these particularly complex transactions.
Sherron Watkins forewarned CEO Kenneth Lay that V & E should
not handle the "preliminary investigation.""
In her view, V & E's
relationship with Enron was so unusual and uncharacteristically close, for
outside corporate counsel, that she recommended that an "independent" law
firm review the questionable partnership transactions.8 7 Watkins had doubts
that V & E could impartially investigate the negative impact of these
transactions on Enron.88 Nevertheless, James Derrick, Executive Vice
President and General Counsel of Enron, hired V & E to conduct a limited
'preliminary investigation" of the concerns and issues Sherron Watkins had
raised with former CEO Kenneth Lay.89
The allegations against V & E in the two pending federal cases are
far less kind than the criticism levied in the Powers Report. The employees'
RICO suit alleges that V & E's investigation of Enron's transactions was
nothing more than a cover-up of Enron's illicit activity, and the securities
suit alleges that V & E participated in structuring illegal partnerships,
'3 Id.at 25-26.

Id at 176-77. The so-called Watkins letter refers to an anonymous document
delivered to Enron CEO, Kenneth Lay, by an employee, Sherron Watkins, who later
claimed responsibility for the document Watkins met with Lay to discuss her
8

concerns about the propriety of Enron's accounting treatment and public disclosures

for some of the special purpose entities known as "Condor" or "Whitewing" and
certain transactions with a related party, LJM, sometimes referred to a the "Raptor"
vehicles. See Henrick Letter, supra note 44; see also Powers Report, supra note 29,

at 172. In her letter, Watkins concluded, "Iam incredibly nervous that we will
implode in a wave of accounting scandals." Id
5id

8 Id
r Id; see also Grimaldi,supra note 75, at A6.
88Grimaldi, supra note 75, at A6.
'9Id.; see also Letter from Max Henrick, III, V& E, to James V. Derrick, Jr., Enron
(Oct
31,
2001),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/veenron 1015011 tr.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,

2002) [hereinafter Henrick letter].
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knowing that they were designed to conceal massive debt which truly
belonged on Enron's balance sheet.
In addition, according to Sherron Watkins, V & E provided "true
sale" opinion letters on some of the "special purpose" partnerships-the socalled "Condor" and "Raptor" deals. 9° While the exact details of V & E's
work is unclear, "true sale" letters are opinion letters that law firms write
vouching that these transactions meet particular legal requirements. Indeed,
one of the primary issues Watkins raised, and V & E was asked to
investigate, was the adequacy of the public disclosures for the "Condor" and
"Raptor" transactions. 91 Specifically, the financial statements and disclosure
materials were criticized for not disclosing sufficient detail so as to reveal the
true nature of these transactions.92
Not apparent from the financial
statements and disclosure materials were issues including: (1) the use of
Enron stock to provide the equity necessary to carry out the transactions with
"Condor" and "Raptor;" (2) identification of earnings through derivative
transactions with Raptor when it could be argued that there was no true
"third party" involved in those transactions; (3) the inability of the Raptor
entities to meet their obligations to Enron due to the falling value of Enron's
stock over the course of 2001-thus raising the question of "Who ultimately
bears the loss?;" (4) apparent conflict of interest problems arising out of a
number of Enron executives having controlling and ownership interests in
some of these "off-the-books" partnerships, and (5) the decision by Enron
management to withhold disclosure, for example, of Andrew Fastow's
compensation from these related party transactions.93
What were V & E's EthicalDuties as Enron's Outside CorporateCounsel?
At the very least, V & E owed a duty to represent Enron competently
under Rule 1.1, 94 which required properly advising Enron on the related
party issues and applicable federal securities laws. Enron, like all public
companies, was required by federal securities law to describe its relatedparty transactions to shareholders and to members of the investing public in a
number of different disclosure documents and reports filed periodically with
90 See Powers Report, supra note 67, at 176-77.
91 See Henrick letter, supra note 45, at 3.
92
id.
93 id.
94 MODEL

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1(2002) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.").
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the SEC on a quarterly and annual basis, and through the annual proxy
solicitation material sent to shareholders. 95 Generally, Enron failed to
disclose material facts that were necessary for an understanding of these
transactions.
Under Rule 1.2, V & E could not assist or counsel Enron to engage
"in conduct that it [knew was] criminal or fraudulent." 96 When a lawyer
knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. 97 If lawyers at V
& E could have reasonably concluded that Enron's activity was criminal,
fraudulent, unlawful or unjust, then V & E should have withdrawn from
representing Enron pursuant to Rule 1.16 (b) (1) or (2). 98 Indeed, even if V
& E was unsure about whether Enron's conduct was unlawful, it could have
withdrawn simply if Enron insisted on pursuing an objective that the law
fu-m considered repugnant or imprudent. 99
Did V & E have an obligation to press management and employees
for more information about the related party transactions? The Powers
Report notes that, although there was discussion by the Board about a review
and disclosure of Fastow's compensation from the LJM partnerships, no one
- neither the members of senior management (i.e., Lay, Skilling or Causey),
nor the Board, nor V & E-ever pressed for the information and Fastow did
not volunteer it.1°° In regard to whether the SEC disclosure rules required
Enron to reveal Fastow's compensation, or his personal interests in these
transactions, "[t]he lawyers apparently searched for and embraced a technical
rationale to avoid that disclosure."' 0 '
Another interesting ethical question is why V & E accepted such a
limited preliminary investigation of Sherron Watkins' allegations as denoted
in the opinion letter dated October 15, 2001 by Max Henrick, I of Vinson
& Elkins. Why did V & E accept such a limited engagement in the face of
Ms. Watkins whistle-blowing memo, which stated that V & E had a conflict?
A possible reason mentioned in the Powers Report is that V & E had quick

9' See 17 C.F.Rt § 229.404 (2002). Item 404 of SEC Regulation S-K sets out the
requirements for disclosing related party transactions in the non-financial statement
irtions of SEC filings, including proxy statements and the annual reports. See id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 1.2 (2002).
97 See id. at R- 1.2(d).
98 See id.
99 See id. at R- 1.16(b)(3).

100 Powers Report, supra note 29, at 190.
101
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access to the information to do the evaluation. 10 2 However, did V & E
consult with and obtain Enron's consent to material limitations on the
preliminary investigation as required by Rule 1.2? Considering Rule 1.7
(b) °3 , could V & E reasonably believe that it could adequately review its
own work product and advice concerning these related party transactions?
Wasn't it in the Enron's best interest, as recommended by Watkins, to have
an "independent" law firm conduct an audit?
Finally, there is the issue of the destruction of Enron's documents by
Arthur Anderson, evidently with the direction and knowledge of at least on
in-house counsel for Anderson, Nancy Temple. At the very least Temple
owed a duty to advise that destruction of the Enron documents with
knowledge that the SEC was undertaking an investigation of Enron's reports
and disclosures was improper if not a criminal offense. Given the presumed
knowledge of the SEC's investigation of Enron, efforts should have been
made to preserve rather than shred pertinent documents. Temple's failure in
this regard, led to the demise of a respected accounting firm and severe
economic consequences for many of its employees.
Are Reforms Needed?
The ABA rules, in my opinion, provide inadequate guidance for
corporate counsel faced with fraud or illegal conduct within an organization.
The confidentiality rules in all states should provide an exception to at least
permit, if not require disclosure of client information necessary to prevent,
mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used
the lawyer's services. The ABA House of Delegates in August 2001 rejected
such a proposal made by the Ethics 2000 Commission. The ABA should be
a leader for reform of the pertinent ethics rules instead of opposing the
federal government's authority to require securities lawyers to do the right
thing.

10

2id.

103 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.7(a)-(b) (2002). ("[A] lawyer shall not

represent a client if the representation... [of that client may] be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.., or a third person, or by the personal
interest of the lawyer..." unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after
consultation. (emphasis added)). Id.
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Fortunately, as stated earlier, most states have not followed the
ABA's approach and allow or require disclosure when a client abuses the
protection of Rule 1.6 by using the lawyer's services to commit fraud on a
third party. The ABA and the states should also amend Rule 1.13 to require
a lawyer to report to the organization's highest authority illegal or fraudulent
conduct by its agents that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
organization. The new Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have the SEC issuing rules
to mandate this disclosure for securities lawyers, but the requirement should
apply to other corporate fraud scenarios beyond the SEC's purview.
Moreover, when the wrongdoers control the organization and reject
counsel's advice to rectify or mitigate ongoing illegal or fraudulent activity,
counsel should be permitted to disclose necessary information to third parties
outside the organization when necessary to prevent substantial economic
harm to third parties or further liability on the part of the corporation. Given
that the attorney's duty is to act in the best interests of the organization (the
"entity" concept), rather than its constituents, disclosure under such
circumstances should not be viewed as adverse or disloyal to the client.
Congress should enact legislation overruling the Central Bank
decision and restore a private cause of action for defrauded investors against
lawyers and accountants who aid and abet their clients in the commission of
federal securities violations. In so doing, the law should impose civil
liability if the lawyer or accountant either knew that a corporate client's
agents were engaged in fraudulent activity or reasonably should have known
under the circumstances, and failed to take appropriate measures to prevent,
rectify or mitigate the consequences of the wrongdoing.
Finally, the SEC should adopt stronger independence rules
prohibiting a professional service firm from conducting an audit, preliminary
investigation or other compliance review of a client if that firm's own advice
or work product is the subject matter of the audit, investigation or review.
The Rules of Professional Conduct should be amended to include a comment
under Rule 1.7, indicating that such circumstances trigger a conflict of
interest under that rule.

